Economic Growth in france and britain, 1830-1910 –a review of the evidence
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Main Findings O’Brien and Keyder

1. Levels of commodity output on par with Britain
2. Laour productivity French industry above British levels until 1890
3. Capital per worker employed French industry – multiple of the comparable British ratio
4. French agric. sector failed to accumulate stock of productive assets match capital-labour, capital land ratios attained in Britain – central and persistent obstacle root of relative backwardness inf agric. in France
5. Could have benefited more rapid transformation 1780 and 1914 – agric. could have been reorganised to release labour whilst maintaining constant levels of production
6. Persistence of a rural society + more traditional patterns of expenditure acted to constrain the development of factory industry.

New statistics present work backwards chain linked indicies

Cameron and Fredemenan view French performance over optimistic respectable not outstanding –

Chenery-Syrquin – describes tendencies of structural change as incomes grow – structural data shows government spending in Britain to be dissimilar from the norm and idiosyncratic consumption and accumulation attempts to develop general models of industrilisation from the British experience are surely ill-advised

Cf. with European norm – France did differ from the norm: school enrolment, foreign investment, proportion output manufacturing construction v. high – BUT France closer to the European average than was Britain.

Provide norms but not characteristic of European development – diversity comparative advantage differed and major influence on paths of development.

O’Brien Keyder key argument France more backward agric. 1840 share agric. income and labour force virtually the same Britain- in 1870 Franc 53.7% labour force agric and 33.5% of income at income level at which Britain eliminate gap sectoral productivity – gap in France still substantial.

Normal figures suggest at income of $900 24.9 income from primary and 39.8 labour in primary sector – substantial productivity gsp – British eliminate gap at $600 France’s experience was more normal

Tables 2 and 3 imply large difference in proportion of income accruing from the service sector – O’Brien and Keyder omit these stats – at $900 level of income French shares 32.7% services – British 47.7 % France will perform well in comparisons confined to commodity output – run risk of substantial bias.

ON BASIS OF PER CAPITA NATIONAL INCOME FRANCE WAS CONSIDERABLY BELOW BRITAIN FROM 1830 TO 1910 – GAP WAS PEOBABLY LARGEST AROUND 1890 NEVER LESS THAN 30% OF BRITISH INCOME LEVEL

Roehl – inverted Gerschenkron model – features for early industrialisation and advancement – “permits abandonment of the stagnation / retardation syndrome”

Simple rank correlations do not support the standard version of the Gerschenkron hypotheses - late developers do not develop strongly - inverse relationship between time of reaching $550 and % workforce in agric. – only .3 between share of agricultural income divided by share of agricultural labour and time + inverse correlation of -.54 between time and share of expenditure in consumption

Coal user per industrial worker is greater for early developers – at $550 dollars France is slowest in terms of industrial output growth.

DO NOT SUPPORT GERSCHENKRON – WHO SAYS THAT LATE DEVELOPERS EXPERIENCE MORE CAPITAL INTENSIVE DEVELOPMENT, GREATER PRESSURE ON CONSUMPTION, EXPERICNED GREAT INDUSTRIAL SPURT, VERY LOW PORDICUTVITY IN AGRIC. RELATED TO INDUSTRY – DO NOT SHOW UP ON A WIDE SAMPLE OF EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

France cf. Britain not appear to be a definite early-comer –France an average performer with atypical demographic experience – AVOID FITTING FRANCE INTO INVERTED GERSCHENKRON MODEL – accept that Britain and France follow different paths of economic development.

French performance respectable revisionist interpretation exaggerates French achievements – French industry less capital intensive than British industry – labour inputs in French industry were higher – labour productivity lower than O’Brien and Keyder believed

O’Brien and Keyder – fiures for relative capital-labour ratios are obtained indirectly and depend on the accuracy of labour productivity figures – surprising to find early 19^th century French industry apparently so much more capital-intensive and discrepancy diminished markedly late 19^th century

Labour productivity growth between 1860 and 1910 lower than Britain and lower than Germany

Revision of figures with correlations by Carre, Dubois and Malinvaud – (deal misinterpreting labour census data) = Levy-Leoyer and Marokovitch + Gfeinstein and Hoffman

Results imply what the retardation school show inferior performance – also show British industrial labour productivity not particularly high by international standards in later 19^th century – Franc was being overtaken by other countries such as Belgium and Germany Table 8 relative standing of France less favourable than O’Brien and Keyder presentation

Table 8 still quite close of O’Brien and Keyder – Real Output per worker measured in terms of end-year price an standard indices of industrial output – O’Brien and Keyder did not have available price data of quality they desired serious difficulty with their calculations.

Problems with census data – Carre use of his figures, rather than census data raises labour force estimate used by O’Biren and Keyder by 15.2% - result hiccup on labour productivity

Marczewski three points:

1. Working popn. In industry in underestimated - Agric. is over estimated
2. Apparent ratio of wage earnings to labour productivity in French industry lower than in Britain during 19^th century – confirmation of the overestimation of productivity in French industry owing to the underestimation of the activie population unemployed
3. No offsetting biases – one has to accept inferior labour productivity in France cf. Britain

Caron also stresses underestimation active working popn. In French census – Caron’s estimates give industrial population 5 million in 1860 – 25% higher than O’Brien and Keyder. Regression equation with other countries in Europe:

French labour power was either 42% more effective than other European countries or 42% underrecorded

CARRE, MARCZEWSKI, CARON ALL SUPPORT VIEW THAT O’BRIEN’S AND KEYDER’S CALCULATION OF INDUSTRIAL LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY THE DENOMINATOR OF LABOUR FORCE INPUTS IS FAR TOO LOW. (Adjustments 15 to 28%)

O and K suggest capital-labour rations higher in France than in British industry – depended on wages in output being measured correctly – may reflect high prices for capital goods and substantial holdings of inventories in France – but they also regard the use of more capital per worker as a plausible explanation of higher industrial labour productivity.

Carre horsepower greater Britain and coal – on this evidence seems unlikely French capital-labour ratios twice as high as those in British industry – coal consumption pe rwokrer .22 of Britain in 1860

Carre et al. £233.7 of capital per worker – comparable for Britain is £350.25 (use O and K’s labour force estimate) = 1860 Feinstein 197.2 in Britain and underestimated labour census figures are used – then France only 178.9 in 1860

Seems v. likely that O and K have substantially overstates industrial labour productivity in France – implausible capital / labour ratios

France appears to have had a somewhat less capital intensive industrial sector than did Britain

Appears probable labour productivity was generally below Britain’s.

French LP higher than Germany 1860

Pattern of labour productivity seems less daming 50 yrs before WW1 – acceleration growth after Great Depression

France’s performance late 19^th century respectable rather than outstanding.

Corrections by Caron, Marcewski and Carre raise industrial labour force inputs – ahgricultural change less because underestimate working hours – leave France with a fairly typical productivity gap between agriculture and the rest of the economy

FRENCH ECONOMIC GROWTH WA REPSECTABLE BUT NOT OUTSTANDING DURING THE 19^th CENTURY – COMPARISONS TAKE BRITAIN AS THE NORM ARE MISLEADING – NOT SAFE TO SAY FRENCH ILP EXCEED BRITISH ILP DURING 19^th CENTURY

LIKEY THAT FRANCE HAD LOWER CAPITAL-LABOUR RAIOS IN INDUSTRY THAN BRITAIN – NOT MAKING UP FOR LATE START – GERSCHENKRON HYPOTHESIS DOES NOT SEEM PARTIUCLALRY PROMISING WAY TO REHABILITATE FRENCH ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE – CF. STRESSING MANU. OUTPUT LIKELY TO BE MOISLEADING – GNP REMIANS A PREFERABLE EMASURE AND BASIS FRANCE NOT COMPARE FAVOURABLY WITH BRITAIN

LOOKS BETTER THAN ONCE THOGHT – O’BRIEN JEYDER AND ROEHL ILLUMINATING CENTRAL ARGUMENTS THAT STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION IN FRANE AND BRITAIN DIFFEREANT – COMAPIROSNS LIEKY TO MISLEAD.

Other Notes in this Category

1. Adaptations of the Traditional Sector
2. Conclusions
3. Definitions and Historiography
4. Direct Transfer
5. Economic Growth in france and britain, 1830-1910 –a review of the evidence
6. Grantham: survey of cliometric contributions to french economic history
7. Growth Rates, Data and Methods
8. Indirect, Embodied Transfer
9. Kindelberger’s review of keyder and o’brien
10. Pioneer industrialiser
11. Post 1750 Growth Coke-Smelting Sector
12. Richard roehl – french industrialisation: a reconstruction
13. Structural Change
14. Technological Transfer: failure, partial adaptations, success
15. The Innovations of the coke blast furnace, of puddling and rolling
16. The modern technology breakthrough ‘right down the line’
17. Tom Kemp – industrialization in nineteenth century europe

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